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Myers: Fifth Amendment

ARTICLE

CODE OF SILENCE: POLICE
SHOOTINGS AND THE RIGHT TO
REMAIN SILENT
ROBERT M. MYERS·

I. INTRODUCTION
Scene: A gritty urban alley. A man lies dead
from gunshot wounds. Standing a few feet away
is the shooter.
Enter:
Two Homicide detectives emerge from
an unmarked police car.
Detective 1 [to shooter]: You're the one that fired
the shots?
Shooter: Yeah.
Detective 1: What happened?
Shooter: I want to talk to my lawyer.
Detective 2: So you won't talk to us?
Shooter: No. I claim my Fifth Amendment privilege.
Detective 1: Then get out of here.

The notion of police detectives allowing a killer to walk
away without providing an explanation is so foreign to the
public consciousness that this scene smacks of a Twilight Zone
episode. Yet, when the shooter is another police officer, scenar-

• Civil rights lawyer, Los Angeles, California. From 1981-1992, the author
served as City Attorney of the City of Santa Monica and was involved in investigating officer-involved shootings. I am grateful to Ronald K.L. Collins and Karl
Manheim for their thoughtful advice and comments and to Joseph W. Doherty for
his research assistance.

497

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3

498

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:497

ios like this are acted out on the streets of American cities. Too
often, this is the real-life world of officer-involved shootings.
Two events in September 1995 gave the public a brief
glimpse of law enforcement officers asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. In the "trial of the century," Los Angeles Police
Department Detective Mark Fuhrman asserted the privilege
during the O.J. Simpson murder trial in response to questions
concerning whether he planted evidence or provided truthful
testimony.l A week later, an FBI agent asserted the privilege
in response to a Senate committee's inquiry concerning the
shootout at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. 2 These highly publicized exercises of the privilege are rare. For the most part, invocations of
the privilege by the police are a regular occurrence outside the
scope of public scrutiny.
At this real-world crossing, two basic tenets of constitutional democracy intersect - control of government and preservation of liberty. On the one hand, the people need to regulate
the state, especially when it is empowered to take human life.
On the other hand, civil liberties must be safeguarded, even
when those who claim them stand in the shoes of the state. At
this juncture, however, we seem to return to the Twilight Zone.
For, it may be asked, how can we both control the state and, at
the same time, grant its agents constitutional protection?
Before we get to this question, it is necessary to first understand just how much and what kind of official latitude we
allow the state when it comes to the sanctioned use of deadly
force by police officials. Having done that, we can then consider
the character and scope of certain constitutional claims sometimes invoked by police officers in this context. This latter
consideration - the central focus of this article - points to a
peculiar phenomenon, namely, the specter of government acting as a powerful deputy authorized to use lethal force and as
a powerless individual in need of constitutional safeguards.
Typically, we do not think of the government wearing both

1. See Stephanie Simon et al., Fuhrman Invokes 5th Amendment, Refuses to
Testify, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at AI.
2. See Ronald J. Ostrow, FBI Agent Declines to Testify About Siege, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1995, at A12.
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hats. Yet, when it does, the result is often perplexing. Having
thus introduced this perplexity, it is now appropriate to return
to a preliminary but nevertheless significant matter - official
use of deadly force in America.
A. DEADLY FORCE: ITS USE

AND CONTROL

In the United States "police are more heavily armed and
shoot more often than police in any other Western democracy."a According to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, "[t]he
most tangible expression of governmental authority is the
power to deprive an individual of 'life, liberty, or property."'·
When police exercise this' awesome power through firing a gun,
"the immediate consequences of their decisions are realized at
the rate of 1,500 feet per second and are beyond reversal by
any level of official review.,,5
Controlling the use of deadly force by law enforcement has
been the focus of police administrators, academ:icians, civil
rights lawyers and community groupS.6 Because law enforcement holds a "virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of
force,"7 managing its exercise represents a key issue "concerning social control in contemporary society."8 Therefore, police
3. James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI . , May 1981, at
110, 111.
4. John C. Hall, Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force, FBI Law
Enforcement Bull., Feb. 1992, at 22.
5. Ed McErlain, Deadly Force: An Age·Old Problem, A Future Solution, CAL.
PEACE OFFICER, Mar. 1992, at 24.
6. Indeed, because the right to use deadly force is sanctioned, "[a]ccountablity
of law enforcement officers is of special importance. . . ." Robert Berkley Harper,
Accountability of Law Enforcement in the Use of Deadly Force, 26 How. L. J. 119
(1983). One law enforcement group noted, "[m]anaging the use of force by officers
is one of the most difficult challenges facing law enforcement agencies today."
International Association of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Policy
Center, Use of Force 1 (1989).
7. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu·
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984). The availability of deadly force
is the central characteristic that distinguishes police from other civilian agencies.
G. Larry Mays & William A. Taggart, Deadly Force as a Police Problem in Local
Law Enforcement: Do Administrative Practices Make a Difference?, 5 POL'y STUD.
REV. 309 (1985).
8. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu·
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984).
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shooting policies squarely raise the complex moral question of
when it is appropriate to take human life. 9
No hard-and-fast rules have been crafted to constrain the
use of deadly force by police officers.10 Instead, an elastic con-

9. See Arnold Binder & Peter Scharf, Deadly Force in Law Enforcement, 28
CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 5 (1982). The regulatory value placed on human life varies
among police agencies. For example, the City of New York Police Department has
adopted the following policy on use of deadly force:
The New York City Police Department recognizes
the value of all human life and is committed to respecting
the dignity of every individual. The primary duty of all
members of the service is to preserve human life.
The most serious act in which a police officer can
engage is the use of deadly force. The power to carry and
use firearms in the course of public service is an awesome responsibility. Respect for human life requires that,
in all cases, firearms be used as a last resort, and then
only to protect life. Only the minimal amount of force
necessary to protect human life should be used by uniformed members of the service. Where feasible, and consistent with personal safety, some warning, such as "POLICE - DON'T MOVE," should be given. Deadly force is
never justified in the defense of property. Above all, the
safety of the public and uniformed members of the service
must be the overriding concern whenever the use of firearms is considered.
New York City Police Department, Patrol Guide, Procedure No. 104-01, July 8,
1993, at 9 (emphasis in original).
By sharp contrast the Seattle Police Department policy provides:
Use of Force - Generally: The public has vested in police
officers the lawful authority to use force to protect themselves and others and perform their official duties when
no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appears to exist and the amount of force used is reasonable
to effect the lawful purpose intended.
The Department's use of force policy implements state
law. To the extent that Department policy may contain
additional provisions not addressed in state law, such
provisions are not intended, nor may they be construed or
applied, to create a higher standard of care or a duty
toward any person or to provide a basis for criminal or
civil liability against the City, its officials or individual
police officers. However, violation of such additional provisions may form the basis for Department disciplinary or
other action.
Seattle Police Department, Policy and Procedure Manual 197.
10. Bright line rules can be developed in some areas of police shootings such
as when to shoot at fleeing suspects. However, so long as deadly force is a law
enforcement option, the individual judgment of police officers will continue to come
into play because "[n]o regulation or directives, however carefully thought out, are
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cept of reasonableness guides the trigger finger. l1 The most
significant judicial limitation of deadly force occurred with the
Supreme Court's 1985 decision holding that deadly force cannot be used to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon.12 Concluding that "[i]t is not better that all felony suspects
die than that they escape,"13 Justice White's majority ruling
noted that it was constitutionally unreasonable to shoot a
fleeing suspect "[ w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat
to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from
failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly
force to do SO.,,14 Although this decision produced a pointed
dissene5 and was criticized by some,16 its impact on the

completely adequate in potentially dangerous situations where critical infonnation
is often incomplete or lacking." R. James Holzworth & Catherine B. Pipping,
Drawing a Weapon: An Analysis of Police Judgments, 13 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.
185 (1985). Hence, it is essential that police officers be appropriately trained in
the use of deadly force. John C. Hall, Firearms Training and Liability, FBI Law
Enforcement Bull., Jan. 1993, at 27.
11. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court established that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
'reasonableness' standard." Id. at 395. The Graham Court stated that the reasonableness of any use of force involves a balancing of the rights of the individual
against interests of the government, requiring "careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight." Id. at 396. Importantly the Court noted that "reasonableness" of force
"must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." [d. at 396.
12. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Garner rejected the old English common law rule under which deadly force could be used to apprehend fleeing
felons. At the time of the decision, Tennessee and 22 other states followed this
rule. Id. at 16-17.
13. [d. at 11.
14. Id.

15. See id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16. See James J. Kilpatrick, A Time to Shoot, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 1985,
at All. Some have suggested that there must be significant costs to deter individuals from fleeing the police. "Murderers, anned robbers, and other violent criminals facing long prison sentences must face the deterrent of deadly force in deciding on whether to flee." Ian C. Weiner, Running Rampant: The Imposition of
Sanctions and the Use of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L. J.
2175, 2194 (1992).
Many law enforcement agencies joined as amici curiae in support of
Cleamtee Garner, the father of the minor killed by the Memphis Police Department. See Police Groups Ask Supreme Court to Modify Fleeing Felon Law, Criminal Justice Newsletter, Sept. 4, 1984, at 4. Their brief observed "that laws permit-
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number of police shootings is questionable. 17 In fact, a significant drop in police shootings had already occurred during
the 1970s as a result of administrative rulemaking by many
police departments to manage the exercise of deadly force. IS
In this deca~e, American police officers have killed over
350 persons annually19 and wounded numerous others.20
Many shootings were controversial21 and some were inevitably
ting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non· violent fleeing
felony suspects actually do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, do not
deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime·
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies." Brief for Police Foundation et aI. as
Amici Curiae at 11, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
17. It did, however, result in greater liability exposure for police agencies. For
example, the City of Santa Monica "agreed to pay almost $1.1 million to the fami·
ly of a recreation leader shot to death by a police officer while running from the
scene of a robbery." Marilyn Martinez, SM to Pay $1.3 Million to Man's Kin, THE
OUTWOK, Aug. 19, 1993, at AI.
18. See Paul G. Chevigny, Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica,
Argentina, and Brazil, 1 CRIM. L.F. 389, 391 (1990). See also Anthony V. Bouza,
Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 337, 345
(1981).
19. U.S. Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 1994: Uniform
Crime Reports 22 (1995). For the period 1990·1994, the following justifiable homi·
cides were committed by law enforcement officers:
1990
385
1991
367
1992
418
1993
455
1994
463
[d. See WILLIAM A. GELLER & MICHAEL SCO'I'l', DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNow
503 (1992). Comparing police fatalities across time may not paint an accurate
picture of trends because a variety of factors account for fatality rates and these
factors may change over time. Factors include "officer marksmanship, type of ammunition, location and number of wounds, and the availability of prompt, high
quality emergency medical care." [d. at 99.
20. There are no national figures on the number of shooting incidents by police officers or the number of persons who received non-fatal wounds. However,
"[t]he numbers of wounded and slain criminal suspects in the United States pale
by comparison to the numbers shot at but missed by police." WILLIAM A. GELLER
& MICHAEL SCO'I'l', DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNow 100 (1992). The following
chart provides information from major police departments for the period from
1980-91:
Shot
Missed
Shot
Fatally
Non-fatally
New York
771
2513
309
Los Angeles
267
435
638
259
Houston
117
502
Atlanta
54
107
390
[d. at 516, 519, 523·24.
21. See, e.g., Tony Perry, Police Killing Outrages Poor Side of Town, L.A.
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unlawful. 22 Studies have demonstrated that the rate of police
shootings vary greatly from city to city.23 In 1992, for exam-

TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at A3; Report Says Suspect Killed by Police Was Shot in
Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993 (National), at A3; Daryl Kelley, Ventura DA
Says Fatal Raid Was Unjustified, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at AI; Jury Absolves
New Jersey Officer in Killing that Ignited Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1
(National), at 19; Patrick J. McDonnell, Officer's Acquittal in Border Slaying
Sparks Protests, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at A3; Was This Shooting Necessary?,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at B6; Evelyn Nieves, Newark Police Shootings Revive
Calls for Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992 (National), at A14; Robert F.
Howe, NAACP is Probing VA Shooting, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at D3;
Roberto Suro, Quiet City in Texas Hears Anger of Blacks Over Woman's Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1992 (National), at A8; Charles Strum, An Officer Admits
Lies in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992 (National), at A12; Andrea Ford &
Richard A. Serrano, Questions Raised About Fatal Shooting by Police, L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 1992, at AI; Steven Lee Myers, A Fatal Shooting By Police Ignites Protest
in Bushwick, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1992 (Local), at A23; Police Shooting Ignites
Disturbance in Mobile, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992 (National), at All; Robert Hanley,
Students March to Protest Handling of Teaneck Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992
(Local), at 29; George Ramos & Rich Connell, 100 Protestors Gather at Scene After
Watts Man is Slain by Police, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, at A28; George James,
Protest Against Police in Flatbush Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991
(Local), at B3; Dean E. Murhpy, Melee Erupts in East L.A After Deputy Kills
Man, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at AI. It should be noted that "[flor most mainstream papers, police reporting means relying mainly on police sources-a practice
that contributes to the undercoverage of police brutality." Kim Deterline, Alternative Media: Going Beyond Police Sources to Uncover Police Abuse, EXTRA!, JulyAug. 1993, at 23.
22. Consider the following audiotape of a fatal shooting by a Los Angeles
County Sheriff deputy that raises significant questions about the decision to use
deadly force:
Officer One: He's got my foot! He's got my foot!
Shoot him! Shoot him! Get off him! Get off, I'm going to
shoot him! [unintelligible] Shoot him! He's got my foot!
Officer Two: No! No! No! No! Wait, wait, wait wait.
Wait. Wait.
[gunshots]
Officer Two: Damn it!
[more gunshots]
Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff, The Los Angeles County Sherift's Department 137 (1992).
23. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1981, at
110; Lawrence W. Sherman & Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring Homicide by
Police Officers, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1979). A comprehensive study
of shooting policies in the County of Los Angeles revealed that "[a]s long as police
policy is in large part simply a reflection of the personal philosophy of the police
chief who administers an individual police department, it is inescapable that fIfty
police departments administered by fifty different chiefs will have substantial differences in policy." Gerald F. Uelman, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police
Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1, 59 (1973).
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pIe, Los Angeles police shot ten people per every 1,000 officers
whereas New York police shot three people per every 1,000
officers. 24 Another study found that the frequency of police
shootings varied from 0.5 to 2.5 persons killed per every
100,000 people. 25 Variations in shooting rates may well be the
result of differing organizational policies concerning the use of
force. 26
Although police shootings sometimes produce demands for
public accountability, police officers understandably tend to be
skeptical of outside scrutiny. As one police chief candidly observed:
The police know they are involved in a violent
business, and seek protection that flexible language will allow. Tragic, but honest, mistakes do
occur in the split-second environment of the
streets, and the police want their flanks protected, especially from the demands of insistent
groups. Police have learned that survivalist
politicians will be tempted to throw them to the
wolves. 27

Police officers may not always believe that the public can fully
appreciate the dangers of police work. 28 Life and death decisions have to be made on the spot and the view among many
officers is that they would rather be "judged by twelve rather
than carried out by Six."29 For some officers, a shooting is the

24. See John L. Mitchell, Officer-Involved Shootings at lO-Year High, LA
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at BI.
25. See Lawrence W. Shennan & Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring Homicide
by Police Officers, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 556 (1979). A more recent
study of 35 cities found that the discharge rate per 100 officers varied from .34 to
7.15 shots. Lorie Fridell, Justifiable Use of Measures in Research on Deadly Force,
17 J. CRIM. JUST. 157, 160 (1989).
26. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL, May 1981, at
110, 112.
27. Anthony V. Bouza, Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 13 U.
TOL. L. REV. 337, 338 (1981) (author was the chief of police of Minneapolis, Minnesota Police Department).
28. One commentator noted: "Police officers patrol the streets of America's
cities today with more fear, despair, doubt and loneliness than ever before." Lee P.
Brown, A Finger in the Dike as Cities Decay, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at B7.
29. William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 144, 147 (Dec. 1984).
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"ultimate clash of good against evil.,,30 The perception that the
public supports tough measures against criminals31 can reinforce some officers' perception that a shooting means instant
justice.32 When department management does not articulate
and enforce clear restrictions on shootings, "subcultural values
defining certain uses of violence as serving positive ends appear to take precedence over legal responsibilities in guiding
the behavior of some officers."33
Police fears of public accountability may well prove unfounded since public scrutiny of police shootings typically tends
to be deferentia1. 34 Internal review is designed in part to buttress public confidence and trust in a police department. 35
Ironically, the specter of civil liability can cause some departments to temper thorough investigation and documentation of
internal reviews. 36 Moreover, it is widely recognized that prosecutors are reluctant to bring charges against police officers.

30. See id. at 150.
31. One expert concluded that "a good part of the public wants the police to
be brutal." Police Brutality, 1 CQ RESEARCHER 635, 639 (1991) (quoting Professor
James Fyfe).
32. See William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 144, 149-50 (Dec. 1984).
33. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statutory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 137 (1984).
34. See William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 144, 146 (Dec. 1984).
35. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1981, at
110, 115.
36. The legal consequences of police shootings preclude documenting improper
police conduct. For example, an article appearing in a law enforcement journal
warned of the legal liability arising from information obtained in internal investigations:
Departmental chiefs and superior officers should be sensitive to material contained in reports of internal investigations of excessive force complaints and be aware that the
findings and conclusions arising from such investigations
will probably find their way into any subsequent civil litigation against the officers and the municipal entity. Further, statements and documents given to outside investigatory agencies are just as likely to be offered against
S.1983 defendants. A cautious, common-sense approach to
post-excessive force investigations, internal or external,
would appear to be the best course.
Milton Thurm, The Post-Excessive Force Investigation: Its Effect on Your Agency's
Civil Liability, THE POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1992, at 8, 9.
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Prosecutors depend upon the cooperation of police officers,
often share the same law enforcement values and "generally
are elected politicians sensitive to the law-and-order sentiments of their constituency."37
Notwithstanding deferential review, police officers are
occasionally disciplined38 or prosecuted39 following their use
of deadly force. Predictably, police officers have sought to protect themselves from such consequences. As discussed in the

37. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu·
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984) (citation omitted). "The police
then are in fact an arm of the prosecutor's officer; all are an intimate part of the
law enforcement apparatus of the state. In such a setting, it is almost impossible
for the prosecutor to be free and unbiased." Arthur L. Kobler, Police Homicide in
Democracy, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 163, 174 (1975).
38. See Victor Merina & Richard A. Serrano, 2 Deputies Fired for Killing of
Disturbed Man, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1992, at A1. The Kolts Commission found:
The LASD rarely sustains civilian complaints of excessive
force. Of those complaints it does sustain, many result in
discipline which appears to far too lenient. . . . [M]ost citizen complaints of excessive force sustained in the last
three years result in suspensions of 5 days or less. Given
that the standard punishment for denting a patrol car
bumper is a 2-day suspension, it is clear that the LASD
does not adequately punish its officers who use excessive
force.
Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff, The Los Angeles County Sherift's Department 119 (1992). A similar conclusion was reached by the Christopher Commission. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
xix (1991) ("[o]f the 2,152 citizen allegations of excessive force from 1986 through
1990, only 42 were sustained").
39. See William Booth, Law Officer is Acquitted in Florida, WASHINGTON POST,
May 29, 1993, at AI; Charles Strum, Grand Jury Indicts 3 Newark Officers, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 1992 (National), at AI; Kevin Sullivan & Veronica T. Jennings,
MD. Officer Gets 1 Year in Fatal Shooting, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1992, at
AI; James Barron, 2 Officers Are Indicted in Shootings of Civilians, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1992 (Local), at B3; New York Police Union Blasts DA Over Indictment of
Officer, Crim. Just. Newsl., Feb. 15, 1985, at 1. However, these prosecutions are
the exception. For example, from 1980 through early 1991, the Los Angeles District Attorney "investigated 678 shootings by LAPD officers . . . and prosecuted
officers in none of them." Ted Rohrlich, Officer Shooting Probes Held Flawed, L.A.
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at A23. However, in June, 1993, "a white Los Angeles police
officer who shot a black tow truck driver has become the county's first law enforcement officer in more than a decade to be charged with murder for a killing
while on duty." Martin Berg, DA Charges Police Officer with Murder, L.A. DAILY
Jo., June 29, 1993, at 1. These charges were dropped in 1995 after two trial resulted in hung juries. John L. Mitchell, Third Trial Ruled Out in Slaying by Officer, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995, at B1.
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next part of this Article, police officers have found this protection in the Fifth Amendment privilege.
B. DEADLY FORCE RECONSTITUTED: POLICE AND THE PRIVILEGE

Some police officers have invoked the Fifth Amendment40
privilege against self-incrimination to minimize their exposure
to criminal prosecution following on-duty shootings. 41 As the
head of its officer-involved shooting unit noted, Los Angeles
Police Department officers will not give voluntary statements
following on-duty shootings. 42 Such attitudes, however problematic, are increasingly becoming part of police culture, a
culture grounded in governmental power and constitutional
privilege.
These practices place in bold relief the point alluded to in
the Introduction - the specter of government acting as a powerful deputy authorized to use lethal force and as a powerless
individual in need of constitutional safeguards. For who could
have imagined that the same right once courageously invoked
40. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V. The "constitutions
of all but two states include language relating specifically to self-incrimination." 8
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2252 (John T.
McNaughton ed. 1961).
The privilege against self-incrimination "protects a person . . . against being
incriminated by his own compelled, testimonial communications." Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). The privilege is not limited to criminal proceedings, but also privileges a person "not to answer official questions put to him in
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420, 426 (1984). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (1968).
41. See, e.g., Dawn Weber, Probes of Police Shootings Get Scrutiny, L.A. DAlLY
NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4.
42. Lt. William Hall is reported to have said: "'[The District Attorney] would
like a statement from the officers that isn't compelled,' Hall said. 'But I don't believe the officers would give a statement unless compelled.'" Dawn Weber, Probes
of Police Shootings Get Scrutiny, L.A. DAlLY NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4. According
to Lt. Hall, "[t]aking compelled statements is necessary ... in order for the department to get a truthful account from its officers." Sheryl Stolberg, Investigator
of Officers Faces the Glare of Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at AI. However,
he also conceded: "'We kind of protect the officers' rights during investigation,'
Hall said. 'It's important that when we talk to the officers they know that we're
not there trying to put them in jail.'" Id.
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against the state by John Lilburne (the 17th-century hero of
the Great Privilege43 ) would later be cowardly invoked by the
state. It is as if the king, having granted the right to his subjects, thereafter realized the need to claim it for himself. However incredible, police now claim the privilege in modern America. The Warren Court's revolution in criminal justice found its
way into the station house not only to protect criminal suspects but also their interrogators.

This exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege is ironic
given police skepticism about the strong safeguards protecting
the constitutional rights of suspected criminals. 44 Indeed, several of the scenarios outlined above have prompted police agencies to accord themselves safeguards that they would probably
deny to criminal suspects. For example, California's Public
Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights46 requires that police
officers be given Miranda-type warnings in certain non-custodial settings. 46
This Article explores the clash between the public'S need
for accountability in police shootings and a police officer's constitutional right to remain silent. 47 Part II charts the legal
43. See LEONARD w. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: AsPECTS OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, 14-39 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Police Response to Appellate Court Decisions:
Mapp and Miranda, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 425, 427 (1978) ("[m]ost police officers apparently perceive that full compliance with the Supreme Court's restrictions on
search and interrogation practices would impose substantial costs on them"); Peter
W. Lewis & Harry E. Allen, "Participating Miranda": An Attempt to Subvert Certain Constitutional Safeguards, CRIME & DELINQ., Jan. 1977, at 75, 77 ("it is not
uncommon for many law enforcement authorities to complain that Miranda serves
only to 'handcuff effective law enforcement activities and ultimately allows 'dangerous criminals to be set free on the streets"'). To some extent, this police criticism is based upon a lack of understanding of the legal rules. As one commentator
noted, "[t]he policeman is supposed to protect your life, rights, and property in
that order; in fact, he protects life and property, and doesn't know your rights."
Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inadequate, 7 POL'y STUD. J. 461 (1978) (quoting unidentified police training officer).
45. CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 3300 et seq. (West 1980).
46. CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 3303(g) (West 1980). See Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 828, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985) ("[p]rior to the
act ... no such advice or admonition was required by law").
47. This Article will examine this issue under the federal Constitution. Because state constitutions often provide more significant protections, it does not
necessarily follow that the conclusions of this Article would apply in every state.
See Jennifer Frisen, State Constitutional Law: Litigation Individual Rights, Claims
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precedents allowing police officers to invoke Fifth Amendment
rights following on-duty shootings. Part III assesses the problems flowing from this invocation. Finally, Part IV explores the
issue of whether police officers can be required to provide an
account of their on-duty shootings useable in a criminal proceeding.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF POLICE OFFICER'S
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
For much of this nation's history, the constitutional rights
of public employees were suspended when they clocked-in for
work. 48 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the point well in
his often-quoted adage that a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman.,,49 Thus, when an employee was suspected
of criminal activity, many jurisdictions required the employee
to surrender the privilege against self-incrimination as a condition of continued employment. 50 The choice faced by officers

& Defenses (1992); Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie & John Kincaid, State
High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A
Judicial Survey, 13 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1986).
48. "For almost the first century of our national existence, federal employment
was regarded as item of patronage, which could be granted, withheld, or withdrawn for whatever reasons might appeal to the responsible executive hiring officer." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148 (1974). See Crenshaw v. United States,
134 U.S. 99 (1890) (Navy officer could be removed from office at will); Parsons v.
United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (President can discharge district attorney at
his pleasure); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900) (post office clerks may
be removed at pleasure). In 1947, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
discharge of a federal employee for engaging in political activity in violation of the
Hatch Act. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Although the
legal rights of public employees expanded during the 1950s and 1960s (Slochower
v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972», the rights of public employees have been more recently scaled-back in
a variety of contexts. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989) (drug testing of public employees permitted without reasonable suspicion); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (reasonableness standards used for
searches of public employees work areas); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
(questionnaire distributed to co-workers in prosecutor's office determined not a
matter of public concern protected by the First Amendment).
49. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). The United
States Supreme Court, over a half century later, reached a similar conclusion. See
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
50. See Note, Mandatory Dismissal of Public Personnel and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1190 (1953). The purpose of these
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confronted with interrogation was succinctly framed by one
court:
Duty required them to answer. Privilege pennitted them to refuse to answer. They chose to
exercise the privilege, but the exercise of such
privilege was wholly inconsistent with their duty
as police officers. They claim that they had a
constitutional right to refuse to answer under
the circumstances, but it is certain that they
had no constitutional right to remain police
officers in the face of their clear violation of the
duty imposed upon them. 51

Speak or be fired requirements came under increasing
scrutiny following the United States Supreme Court's 1964
decision that the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the states. 52 Later, in Garrity v. New Jersey,53 the
statutes was straight-forward:
The avowed purpose of the statutes is to remove from
office those who would obstruct investigation into the
affairs of government by claiming their right against selfincrimination. The statutes make no distinctions as to the
type of office holder, the nature of the questions asked, or
the duties performed by the person under question.
[d. at 1191 (footnotes omitted). It appears that many of these statutes were enacted as tools in the legislative investigation of subversive activity. [d. at 1190. In
fact, many of the cases delineating the constitutional rights of public employees
arose in the context of the ill-fated efforts of the post-World War II period to
stamp out activities deemed subversive. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (public employment may not be conditioned on surrender of
associational rights); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Alder v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding law authorizing membership in certain organizations as prima facie evidence of unfitness for teaching
position); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (dismissal of public employee for refusal to disclose Communist Party affiliation upheld).
51. Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567-68, 92 P.2d 416,
419 (1939). The court based its conclusion upon the role police officers play in
society:
When police officers acquire knowledge of the facts which
will tend to incriminate any person, it is their duty to
disclose such facts to their superiors. . . . It is for the
performance of these duties that police officers are commissioned and paid by the community, and it is a violation of said duties for any police officer to refuse to disclose pertinent facts within his knowledge even though
such disclosure may show, or tend to show, that he himself has engaged in criminal activities.
[d. at 568, 92 P.2d at 419.
52. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment values were compromised by efforts to force police officers to choose between
their jobs and self-incrimination. 54 In an investigation by the
state attorney general, officers suspected of ticket-flxint5
were informed that state law mandated their termination if
they invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. 56 Each officer
elected to answer questions and some of their answers were
later used against them in obtaining convictions for conspiracy
to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. 57 Noting that
police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights,»58 the Court held that their compelled
testimony violated the Fifth Amendment. The dilemma of
choosing between one's job and self-incrimination was "the
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. »59
The Justices thus concluded that the privilege provides a
shield against the use of "statements obtained under threat of
removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they
are policemen or other members of our body politic.,)6O
A year later, in Gardner v. Broderick,61 the Court considered the flip-side of the dilemma faced by the officers in
Garrity.62 In Gardner, a police officer was summoned before a
53. 385 u.s. 493 (1967).
54. Along with Garrity, the Court decided Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967). The Court held that a lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings could not be
disciplined for failing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court
noted that "[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a
lawyer relinquish the privilege." 1d. at 516.
55. The police officers were accused of falsification of court records, alteration
of traffic tickets, and diversion of monies derived from bail and fines. New Jersey
v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209, 214, 207 A.2d 689, 691 (1965).
56. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. New Jersey's forfeiture provision applied to any
public officer or employee who refused "to testify upon matters relating to the
office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution." 1d. at 494 n.l (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-71.1 (Supp. 1965».
57. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495. The trial court admitted the statements only
after conducting a hearing to determine if the officers' statements were voluntary.
1d. at 495 n.2.
58. 1d. at 500.
59. 1d. at 497.
60. 1d. at 500.
61. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
62. Gardner arose in the context of an employee seeking reinstatement after
being terminated for refusing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. 1d.
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grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation. The
officer was requested to sign a waiver of his Fifth Amendment
privilege and was informed that job loss would be the consequence of invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. 63 Declining to waive the privilege, the officer was discharged. 64 Finding that the officer was fired solely for refusing to relinquish
the privilege against self-incrimination,65 Justice Fortas concluded that "the mandate of the great privilege against selfincrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on
penalty of loss of employment.'>66
Although the Gardner Court held that a police officer
could not be fired for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege,67 the Court indicated that the police officer could be fired

at 274.
63. [d. The New York Constitution continues to contain a provision that a
public officer shall be removed from office for failure to sign a waiver of immunity
to answer relevant questions before a grand jury. N.Y. Const. art I, § 6 (McKinney
1982).
64. [d. at 275.
65. [d. at 278.
66. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 279. The Court relied on Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965), where it found that commenting on a defendant's silence at trial
was a penalty on the exercise of the fIfth amendment privilege. Justice Douglas
observed in Griffin: "For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice: which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is
a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." [d. at 614 (citation and footnote
omitted).
The Fifth Amendment principle applied in Gardner is similar to the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides
that the government may not grant a benefIt-which it has the right to withhold
altogether-on the condition that the recipient of the beneflt surrender a constitutional right. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L.
REV.. 1415 (1989). Since government employment is considered a privilege
(Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), affd (by an equally divided court) 341 U.S. 918 (1951)), Gardner
could have been decided on unconstitutional condition principles. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment beneflts overturned because
claimant required to choose between free exercise of religious beliefs and forfeiting
benefIts). However, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against penalties applies in
contexts where the unconstitutional condition doctrine would not apply. For example, in Griffin the Court held that prosecutors could not comment on a criminal
defendant's silence at trial because it would constitute an inappropriate penalty for
exercise of the privilege. No privilege or benefIt was involved in Griffin and the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions could not have been invoked.
67. A companion case decided the same day, Uniformed Sanitation Men Associ-
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for failing to answer questions relating to job performance so
long as the answers were not used in a criminal proceeding. 68
Thus, if the officer's responses were immunized from use in
criminal proceedings, the officer's employer could compel answers to questions about job performance and those answers
could be used against the officer in an administrative or civil
proceeding to terminate the officer's employment. 69
Following Gardner,70 lower federal courts and state courts
have applied Garrity and Gardner on a number of occasions.71
ation v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968), held that sanitation workers could not
be terminated for failing to waive immunity. They would entitled to assert the
privilege because their governmental employer was seeking "testimony from their
own lips which, despite the constitutional prohibition, could be used to prosecute
them criminally." Id. at 283.
68. See Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
69. The Fifth Amendment only prohibits compelled testimony in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the compelled testimony can be used in civil or administrative proceedings. Theoretically, the consequence of job loss may be more severe
than sanctions flowing from criminal prosecution. However, the consequences of
lying are usually greater in a criminal investigation than lying to a superior in an
administrative investigation.
70. The United States Supreme Court has extended its holding to public works
contractors (Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973» and high level political officeholders (Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977».
71. ALA: Benjamin v. City of Montgomery, 785 F.2d 959 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986) (police officers could not be terminated for invoking
privilege; "at the time they first were called to the stand, appellants were not the
subject of any disciplinary proceeding, and had not been directed to answer questions on pain of dismissal"); ARZ: William v. Pima County, 791 P.2d 1053 (Ct.
Apps. Ariz. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990) (police officer fired for refusing
to answer questions; "grant of immunity by a proper judicial officer was not a prerequisite to his employer's right to require that he answer the employer's questions during the investigation"); CAL: Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d
822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (Cal. 1985) (police officer reinstated after
being fired for failure to answer questions since he was not advised that statement could not be used against him in criminal proceeding); Williams v. City of
Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 3d 195, 763 P.2d 480, 252 Cal.Rptr. 817 (Cal. 1988) (officer
was not entitled to reinstatement for failure to be properly advised that answers
could not be used against him criminally since he answered questions); FLA:
Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983) (although employee can be ordered to answer questions, employee could not
be ordered to answer same questions by means of polygraph examination); GA:
Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985) (police officer who was not required
to waive privilege could be terminated for refusing to answer questions relating to
job); MASS: Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 492 N.E.2d 77 (Mass. 1986) (a public employee may be compelled to answer questions relating to the job and the answer
may not be used against the employee in a criminal proceeding); MISS: Knebel v.
City of Biloxi, 453 So.2d 1037 (Miss. 1984) ("[s]ince Garrity holds that a statement, given by a police officer about his official conduct under questioning from
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Although Gardner was silent on the procedures necessary to
compel job-related information from employees for non-criminal purposes, courts across the country have authorized local
government agencies to grant use immunity without any statutory authorization. 72 Generally, use immunity is conferred
pursuant to statute and requires application to a court by an
authorized officer. 73 However, courts have held that use im-

state authorities under threat that if he does not answer he will be fired, is inadmissible into evidence in a criminal proceeding against the officer, it follows that a
statement given under the promise that it will not be used against him in a criminal proceeding is likewise inadmissible"); NJ: Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 436
A.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. N.J. 1981) (police officer may not be disciplined for
failure to cooperate in investigation where he is the target and has not been offered immunity); NY: Matt v. Larocca, 71 N.Y.2d 154, 524 N.Y.S.2d 180, 518
N.E.2d 1172 (N.Y. 1987), cen. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988) (public employees may
be compelled to answer questions so long as answers cannot be used in criminal
proceeding); OHIO: City of Warrensville Heights v. Jennings, 569 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio
1991) (refusal of police dispatcher to take polygraph examination justified termination); Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1990) ("public employees can be required to answer potentially incriminating questions, so long as
they are not asked to surrender their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination"); PA: DiCiacco v. Civil Service Commission, 389 A.2d 703 (Com. Ct. Pa.
1978) (employees can be ordered to answer questions if the employee is not told
that "so as long as they have not indicated to the employee that assertion of his
constitutional right to remain silent or a refusal to waive immunity from prosecution will constitute grounds for discharge"); TX: Firemen's & Policemen's Civil
Service Commission v. Burnham, 715 S.W.2d 809 (Ct. Apps. Tex. 1986), cen. denied, 488 U.S. 842 (1988) (officer could be terminated for failure to take polygraph
examination concerning alleged rape); Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir.
1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983) (police officers properly fired for refusing
to answer question even though they were not advised that answers could not be
used against them in criminal proceeding).
72. See Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 670 (11th Cir. 1985) (no statutory grant
of use immunity required); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496
(11th Cir. 1985) ("privilege against self-incrimination affords a form of use immunity which, absent waiver, automatically attaches to compelled incriminating
statements as a matter of law. Given this, any grant of use immunity to the
plaintiffs would have been duplicative"); Knebel v. City of Biloxi, 453 So. 2d 1037,
1040 (Miss. 1984) (immunity flows "not from the authority of the interrogator to
make such a promise, but the very nature of the Fifth Amendment"); Jones v.
Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Ohio 1990) ("[t]he privilege against
self-incrimination is preserved because a statement by investigators that nothing
said at the hearing can be used at a subsequent criminal proceeding effectively
immunizes that testimony from later use by a prosecutor").
73. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1784(c) (West 1989) (National Credit Union Administration Board may apply to any court of the United States for order compelling person to give testimony or produce documents); 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-1(c)(12)(D)(iii)
(West Supp. 1993) (Federal Trade Commission may apply to district court for
order compelling testimony in certain civil investigative proceedings); 15 U.S.C.A. §
1312(i)(7)(B) (West 1982) (Attorney General may apply to district court for order
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munity flows directly from the Constitution when a public
employee is ordered to answer questions by a superior under
threat of termination. 74
In light of this history, it is not surprising that some police
officers invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege following a
shooting. 75 Lawyers defending the police quite understandably

compelling testimony in certain anti-trust civil investigations); 18 U.S.CA § 6003
(West Supp. 1993) (United States Attorney may apply to district court for order
compelling testimony before court or grand jury); 18 U.S.C.A. § 6004 (West 1985)
(agencies, with the approval of Attorney General, may issue order compelling testimony in proceeding before agency); 18 U.S.CA § 6005 (West 1985) (authorized
congressional officer may apply to district court for order compelling testimony
before congressional proceedings); 21 U.S.C.A § 884 (West 1981) (United States
Attorney may apply to district court for order compelling testimony before court or
grand jury in connection with violation of drug laws); 28 U.S.CA § 594(a)(7)
(West Supp. 1993) (Independent Counsel may exercise power of Attorney General
or United States Attorney and apply to district court for immunity under certain
federal statutes).
28 U.S.CA § 1782 (West 1966) (district court cannot compel
testimony in aid of proceeding before foreign or international tribunal "in violation
of any legally applicable privilege").
In United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court declined the
government's request for the court to provide immunity for the act of producing
certain documents. It expressly "decline[d] to extend the jurisdiction of courts to
include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request
that the statute requires." [d. at 616 (footnote omitted).
74. See supra note 70 and cases cited therein.
75. One officer, who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding against a suspect he shot, explained his reasons for not testifying
as follows:
Q. Officer you said you felt it was not in your best interest to testify. What did you mean by that?
A. Meaning that their investigation isn't concluded and
basically until that's concluded, it wouldn't be wise for me
to make any statements about that night. It would be
similar to us bringing the defendants up here and asking
them to give details about the victims's house.
Q. Let me ask you this: When you say it wouldn't be
wise, do you think it would subject you to some kind of
civil liability?
A. It may.
Q. And how is that?
A. I don't know, anything's possible. Until the
investigation's concluded, I don't know what may come of
it.
Q. Okay. And do you think it would subject you to some
criminal liability if you testified in this case?
A. The way things are nowadays in regards to scrutiny
on police, who knows?
Q. All right. So, you're basing your answer not on some-

Cr.
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recommend this tactic. A newsletter of a law firm representing
California law enforcement officers concluded that
"[s]ubmission to an investigator's pressure for a voluntary
statement, which can be used against the officer for any purpose, is not to the officer's legal benefit." Instead, it advised:
An officer who has just been involved in a shooting has no legal obligation to give an oral or
written statement to any agency, unless required to do so by a superior officer. This is
another way of saying that a law enforcement
officer has Fifth Amendment rights not to give a
voluntary statement just like any citizen does. 76

The number of officers refusing to provide voluntary statements following on duty shootings is unknown, although one
big metropolitan area sheriff has detected "an alarming increase in the number of these officers who refuse to be interthing specific in your case but just because anything's
possible these days, is that a fair statement?
A. In essence.
Partial Transcript of Preliminary Examination, Nov. 23, 1992, at 15-16, People v.
Robbins, Case No. SA 011711 (Mun. Ct. Santa Monica Jud. Dist.).
76. Silver, Goldwasser & Shaeffer, Client Newsletter, Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 3. Following this newsletter, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block notified police
chiefs that its homicide investigators were facing difficulty because of "confusion"
caused by articles such as the Client Newsletter. Letter from Sherman Block to
RUl1sell K Siverling, Police Chief of Alhambra, California, dated June 20, 1990, at
2. In response, the firm noted:
In a letter to police chiefs in Los Angeles County, Sheriff
Sherman Block has criticized this office's policy of advising clients not to give a voluntary statement in a shooting investigation.
. . . [W]hat is in the best interest of the officer involved
in the shooting? Clearly, if there is an irrevocable, unconditional guarantee that the officer will not be prosecuted,
then there is no fear that what he says might be used in
a criminal prosecution. He could make a voluntary statement.
. . . We are concerned; we want you to make a statement only if you are ordered to do so. Why? Because
then your statement is a coerced one and it cannot be
used against you in a criminal matter.
Silver, Goldwasser, Shaeffer & Hadden, Client Newsletter, Fall 1991, at 1. Thus
far, the regular practice of invoking the privilege is limited to officer involved
shootings. However, the legal principles that permit the invocation of the privilege
would apply to other situations. Conceivably, an officer could invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege and decline to prepare a report any time he or she has a
physical encounter with a suspect.
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viewed. "77 Like other individuals, the decision whether to
speak. or remain silent is a personal one. Of course, some officers ignore the advice of their attorneys simply in belief that
they have nothing to hide. On the other hand, invoking the
privilege may not be looked upon favorably by the command
structure in some departments, and officers may conclude that
remaining silent will hinder career advancement. Other officers exercise their rights to remain silent out of fear of being
second-guessed by prosecutors.

III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REMAINING SILENT
Obviously, an officer's refusal to provide information can
seriously impair the investigation of the shooting. This point
was echoed by an independent police commission which found:
When the LAPD does interview the involved
officer, the officer's statement is usually "compelled" under the statutory Police Officers' Bill
of Rights. Legally, no "compelled" statement can
be used in any criminal prosecution of that officer. Similarly, any information or discoveries
obtained directly or indirectly from that statement cannot be used against the compelled officer in a criminal proceeding. When these compelled statements are taken at the beginning of
the administrative investigation, any potential
criminal prosecution will likely be very difficult
to pursue. 78

77. Letter from Sherman Block to Russell K. Siverling, Police Chief of
Alhambra, California, dated June 20, 1990, at 1.
78. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LoS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 161-62 (1991). The report found the process of investigating officer-involved
shootings was seriously flawed. Other problems included:
Officers at the scene are frequently gathered together and
interviewed as a group, which many have appropriately
criticized as an opportunity for witnesses to "get their
stories straight."
Officer statements are often not recorded until completion
of a "pre-interview," which is attended only by LAPD
officers. Only when the "pre-interview" is concluded is a
recorded statement taken.
[d. at 161.
Prosecution of persons upon whom immunity has been conferred can be
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Equally problematic, a police officer invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination following an on-duty shooting does
not inspire public confidence about the propriety of the officer's
conduct. 79 The police are understandably regarded as the
"thin blue line" protecting the public from criminal conduct.
The public perception of the Fifth Amendment privilege does
not coincide with the eloquent prose of Supreme Court decisions. Although the Court has called the privilege "the hallmark of our democracy,"SO the average person on the street is
likely to regard it "as safe harbor for those who break society's
rules."sl
The exercise of privilege is far more than a "public relations" problem. Both criminal and civil proceedings arising out
of the police shootings can be adversely affected by an officer's
claim to silence. In a criminal proceeding, the invocation of
complicated. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, modified, 920 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). Although a prosecutor is not
barred from having access to immunized testimony (Gwillim v. City of San Jose,
929 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Gwillim, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1254, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990», prosecution may be foreclosed if a court cannot
"escape the conclusion that the testimony could not be wholly obliterated from the
prosecutor's mind in his preparation and trial of the case." United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973). As the United States Supreme Court
observed, "[t]estimony obtained pursuant to a grant of statutory use immunity may
be used neither directly nor derivatively." Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
117 (1988). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972).
In the Rodney King beating case, the convicted police officers asserted on
appeal that certain witnesses had been exposed to their immunized statements.
United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejecting this
argument, employing a test that requires a showing that "the substance of the
exposed witness's testimony is based upon on a legitimate source that is independent of the immunized testimony." Id. at 1432. The D.C. Circuit requires an additional showing that the exposed witness has not shaped or altered his or her
testimony in any way as a result of the exposure. United States v. Poindexter, 951
F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ , 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
79. Moreover, the refusal of police officers to explain their actions creates the
appearance of unequal application of the law. If an individual kills someone and
declines to provide any facts establishing justification, the police would virtually
always make an arrest and take the person to jail. However, in the case of the
officer who shoots someone, it is accepted practice that officer can assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege without adverse consequences.
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (Warren, C.J.) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 582 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting».
81. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1986). See Henry J.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 679 (1968).
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privilege by an arresting police officer can result in the dismissal of the charges against the suspect. S2 In a civil proceeding, adverse inferences can be drawn from the invocation of
privilege. s3 Either way, the point remains: police invocation of
privilege exacts high societal costs.
Moreover, the public scrutiny essential to democratic control of police. agencies is diminished significantly in the absence of public documents describing the facts surrounding a
shooting. Police reports prepared in the normal course of business are generally public records at some stage. 54 However,
immunized statements taken during the course of administrative investigations are usually considered internal or personnel
documents unavailable for public inspection. S5 Hence, police

82. The following exchange occurred in the preliminary hearing of a anned-robbery suspect who was shot by a police officer:
Q. Officer Suarez, how are you currently employed?
A. By the City of Santa Monica as a police officer.
Q. And were you so employed on the evening of September 23rd, 1992?
A. Regarding the events of that night, based on the advice of my attorney and the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, I'm going to decline to
answer your questions.
Partial Transcript of Preliminary Examination, Nov. 23, 1992, at 2, People v. Robbins, Case No. SA 011711 (Mun. Ct. Santa Monica Jud. Dist.).
83. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) ("Fifth Amendment does not
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify
in response to probative evidence offered against them"). See United States v.
Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[a] party who asserts the privilege
against self-incrimination must bear the consequence of lack of evidence"); Robert
Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91
YALE L.J. 1062 (1982).
In Shepherd v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 550 P.2d 161, 130 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1976), plaintiff in a wrongful death action arising from a police shooting
sought an order precluding the defendant police officers from asserting the privilege against self-incrimination at their depositions. Although the court concluded
that there was no basis for overriding the privilege, it did note that "[i]f such
assertions continue to be made at trial the question of 'appropriate juristic
consequences' may well arise at that time." Id. at 117, 550 P.2d at 166, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 262.
84. For example, the California Public Records Act, CAL. GoV'T. CODE §§ 62506268 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994), requires that law enforcement agencies make
available to the public certain infonnation concerning arrests "except to the extent
that disclosure of a particular item of infonnation would endanger the safety of a
person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of
the investigation or related investigation." Id. § 6254(0 (West Supp. 1994).
85. In Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me. 1979), the Maine Su-
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invocation of the privilege places certain constitutional principles in conflict with the democratic ideal of open government.
The secrecy surrounding police shootings encourages a
police agency to provide the press with the most favorable
aspects of a shooting while concealing certain damaging facts.
In some departments, it is not uncommon that shooting accounts are given a favorable "spin" so they ''become reinterpreted and refashioned to fit common public understandings of
when and why police must shoot."86
Finally, the practice of police officers conferring use immunity on their colleagues in the same department can only further the unwritten code of silence87 that is prevalent in many
police agencies. 88 The code of silence "mandates that no officer
report another for misconduct, that supervisors not discipline
officers for abuse, that wrongdoing be covered up, and that any
investigation or legal action into police misconduct be deflected
and discouraged.,,89
Both the exercise of the privilege and the conferring of use
immunity advance the objectives of the code of silence. The
practice of police officers conferring immunity on other police
officers "sanctions official lawlessness.,,9o Equally troubling is

preme Judicial Court concluded that the State's Freedom of Access Act's exemption
of "privileged" records applied to involuntary statements taken from police officers
in administrative investigations. 1d. at 348.
86. William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 144, 153 (Dec. 1984). Not surprisingly, "[s]ecrecy and lack of procedural
safeguards inevitably foster suspicion about the fairness of internal review." National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence 385 (1969).
87. The code of silence "is an unwritten rule and custom that police will not
testify against a fellow officer and that police are expected to help in any cover-up
of illegal action." David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?
1992 MARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481 n.60 (1992).
88. See Athelia Knight & Benjamin Weiser, D.C. Police Chief Praises Officer
Who Broke Police Code of Silence, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 16, 1983, at B1; Tim
Weiner, Ex-Officer Who Broke Code of Silence Given Probation, PHlLA. INQUIRER,
Feb. 13, 1985, at 1.
89. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained? 1992 MARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992).
90. Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1990) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). He stated: "The majority's result sanctions official lawlessness-lawlessness of the worst sort since the very people engaging in it are those
whom we depend upon to enforce the law. If we permit this, who will watch the
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the fact that "police investigators, investigating another police
officer for suspected criminal activity, can in effect accord the
suspected officer (a public employee) absolution for whatever
criminal activity has occurred and has been admitted to investigators."91 The problem, of course, is the real potential of
conflict of interest, favoritism, and unchecked discretionary
justice.
By itself, the troublesome reality of the exercise of the
privilege presents no justification for police officers scuttling its
use. Society has a general interest in uncovering information
about criminal activities, yet the availability of the privilege
curtails governmental information gathering. Indeed, since
private citizens have full protection of the privilege following
shootings, it is not unreasonable to suggest that police officers
should be afforded similar safeguards.
Immunity is the general price that society pays when it
desires to compel information, reflecting "a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.,,92
Some of the problems caused by allowing police officers
immunitycould be ameliorated through measures prohibiting
immunity except in accordance with the statutory procedures
providing for third party review. 93 Although this reform would
halt the questionable practice of police officers conferring immunity on their own, less information would be disclosed since
neither timely voluntary nor compelled statements would be
available. 94
Yet, immunity does not fully address the special account-

watchman?" Id. at 950.
91. Id.
92. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
93. Other refonns might include making the immunized statements public
records, thereby removing the cloak of secrecy that surrounds officer involved
shootings. Although these responses merit consideration, they do not raise signif·
icant constitutional issues and will not be the focus of the article.
94. "Accurate and timely reporting of use of force incidents is the essential
first step in the process of monitoring and controlling such responses." Interna·
tional Association of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Police Center, Use
of Force 6 (1989). It is unlikely that prosecutors would seek to confer immunity
until after other avenues of investigation had been exhausted.
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ability required when police shoot. When a private citizen
shoots, he or she is, by definition, not doing so on behalf of the
state. By contrast, police officers "have at their disposal the
capacity to act as judge, jury, and executioner."95 The wrong
decision can needlessly take human life and expose the police
officer's governmental employer to major financial liability.96
Legitimate concerns may exist about continuing to confer such
authority on an individual who declines to remain fully accountable. Instead, personal concerns are elevated above the
interests of the agency which conferred the power to use deadly force.
Public confidence in the life and death decisions of police
agencies can best be advanced by requiring that police officers
comply with post-shooting reporting procedures mandated by
most police departments. The Atlanta Police Department's
policy is illustrative of these requirements:
a. An employee discharging a firearm shall, as
soon as possible, take the necessary steps to
report the discharge.
b. An employee on or off duty shall notify
his/her immediate superior officer as well as the
officer in command of the zone facility or district
in which the discharge took place. The employee
shall submit all necessary reports without undue
delay.97

The rule further provides for far more detailed information
concerning the use of deadly force, including:
whether [the] firearm and ammunition were
department issued or approved; the number of
shots fired; the reason for the discharge; the
distance between the employee and the person
fired at when first shot was fired; who fired first
shot; if employee was being fired on, how many

95. G. Larry Mays & William A Taggart, Deadly Force as a Police Problem in
Local Law Enforcement: Do Administrative Practices Make a Difference?, 5 POL'y
STUD. Rev. 309 (1985).
96. In one month, the City of Santa Monica paid $1.3 million to settle one
police shooting case and $1.1 million to settle another. Marilyn Martinez, SM to
Pay $1.3 Million to Man's Kin, THE OUTLOOK, Aug. 19, 1993, at A1.
97. Atlanta Police Department, Firearms Policy, Rule 6.10.
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shots were fired at the employee. All the above
information shall be included in the narrative
and supplement portion of the incident report. 98

It seems clear that such policies cannot be enforced when an

officer invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. In what
follows, this Article tests whether this assumption is correct.
IV. SILENCING THE PRIVILEGE IN OFFICER-INVOLVED
SHOOTINGS
Few would deny that requiring police officers to provide
reports of their official actions is essential to the proper administration of our criminal justice system. Likewise, sanctioning
police officers for failing to honor reporting requirements for
some illegitimate reason, or for no reason, would not raise
bona fide Fifth Amendment concerns. However, when the officer declines to prepare the report by asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination, public duty and individual rights
clash.

Garrity and Gardner form the foundation on which police
officers claim they cannot be compelled to provide an accounting of an on-duty shooting without first receiving immunity.
Still, this foundation all too readily turns to quicksand when
one recognizes the limited scope of the Supreme Court's holdings, and when one considers the rule and role of the required
records doctrine. Consistent with these constitutional doctrines, at least one conclusion is clear: A police officer can be
required to provide an unimmunized account of an on-duty
shooting or face job loss.

98. [d. A model policy on the use of force developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Policy Center provides that a
written report should be prepared whenever a "firearm is discharged outside of the
firing range." International Association of Chief of Police National Law Enforcement Policy Center, Use of Force-Model Policy 1 (1989).
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GARRITY-GARDNER

Garrity and Gardner were decided during the halcyon days
of the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure. For
better or worse, the doctrinal principles which provided their
foundation have not been generally expanded. Instead, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have significantly curtailed Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. 99

Similarly, public employees have not fared well in seeking
safe harbor under other constitutional provisions. 1°O Given

99. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991) (court held that
hannless error rule applies to admission of coerced confession); Baltimore City
Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (compelled production of child not protected by Fifth Amendment); Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988) (sole shareholder could be compelled to produce records even
though production might incriminate him); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986) (volunteered statement by mentally ill person not the product of police coercion notwithstanding the fact that statement may not have been "voluntary"); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (the court created a public safety exception
to the giving of Miranda warnings); Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (no 5th Amendment violation in
conditioning student aid on draft registration); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984) (admissions made by probationer to his probation officer without prior
warning admissible even though probationer compelled to be honest with such
officer); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (Court held that admission
into evidence of refusal to take a blood-alcohol test following arrest for drunk
driving did not violate Fifth Amendment); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242
(1980) (environmental reporting requirement did not violate Fifth Amendment);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (individual can be compelled to produce tax records prepared by accountant; act of production not sufficiently testimonial); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (failure to testify for Fifth
Amendment reasons can be commented on in civil proceeding); Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (defendant failed to assert Fifth Amendment and his
response on tax form could be used against him); Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972) (use immunity is constitutional; prosecutor bears burden of proving
independent source of evidence in subsequent prosecution); California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424 (1971) (required records doctrine applicable to California requirement that
drivers give identity following accident). See generally Leonard W. Levy, Against
the Law: The Nixon Court and Criminal Justice 165-73, 181-87, 428 (1974).
100. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(court applies balancing test to uphold warrantless drug testing of public employees without reasonable suspicion); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (court
applies balancing test to arrive at reasonableness standard for searches of public
employee work areas); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (questionnaire to
other prosecutors not matter of public concern and not protected by First Amendment); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (Court enforces agreement for
confidentiality signed by former CIA employee). But see Rankin v. McPherson, 483
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the decisional law in this area, an oracle might safely predict
that the current Court might well jettison Garrity and Gardner
if given the opportunity.101 Even the often liberal Justice
John Paul Stevens appears prepared to cast off GarrityGardner. In a dissenting opinion in Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham,lo2 he concluded that the state's compelling interest in avoiding an appearance of corruption by policymakers
justified the loss of office for invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege. 103 In light of the power and public trust accorded to
police, Justice Stevens questioned whether he would have
joined in the Garrity and Gardner decisions. 104
Yet, casting Garrity and Gardner far adrift is unnecessary.
Instead, anchoring these cases to their factual setting of criminal investigations and not everyday reporting requirements
could provide an appropriate accommodation of the competing
interests at stake. A survey of post Garrity decisions lends
ample support to this narrowing construction.
Police officers have unsuccessfully attempted to exclude
reports prepared in the normal course of their duties from
criminal trialS. 105 Arguing that preparation of the reports
U.S. 378 (1987) (employee's comment following attempt to assassinate the President held matter of public concern).
101. The Garrity-Gardner cases have not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Henry J.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 679, 707 (1968). The United States Supreme Court, in a Fourth
Amendment context, made a similar observation in finding that "[p]ublic
employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue
of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation." O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
102. 431 U.S. 801 (1977). Cunningham struck down a statute that required a
state political party officeholder to choose between holding office and self-incrimination. Under the New York Election Law, a political party officer could be required to testify about the conduct of his or her party office; the refusal to answer
questions or waive immunity resulted in the forfeiture of office. [d. at 802-03.
103. See id. at 813-14. He believed that the "claim of privilege can only erode
the public's confidence in its government." ld. at 815.
104. See id. at 814 n.12.
105. See United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980) ("[w]e do not think that the
subjective fears of defendant as to what might happen if he refused to answer his
superior officers are sufficient to bring him within Garrity's cloak of protection);
United States v. Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1978) (use of arrest report made by
officer did not violate privilege since "fifth amendment proscribes compelled self-in-
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were mandated by department regulations,106 officers have
claimed that the reports are "compelled" for Fifth Amendment
purposes.10 7 This argument has been consistently
rejected. l08 Likewise, the failure to write a report has been
subject to disciplinary action when there was no evidence that
the employee believed that writing the report would form the
basis of criminal prosecution.l09 Such precedents reveal the

crimination, not incriminating statements"); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d
607 (Mass. 1986) (use of statement obtained in administrative investigation following shooting); Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983) (use of statement
obtained in administrative investigation of citizen complaint).
In Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983), the court held that an
officer's statements made during an administrative investigation of a shooting
could be used against him in a criminal trial charging the officer with murder and
involuntary manslaughter.
In the instant case the questioning of appellee was mandated by departmental regulation, and represented standard procedure operative whenever a policeman discharges
a firearm resulting in injury or death. The shooting occurred while appellee was engaged in the performance of
his duty, pursuing a suspected felon who offered resistance, and there was nothing in the information then
available to suggest that appellee's conduct was unlawful.
It was not until five days later, after the post-mortem
examination indicated that blows to the decedent's head
may themselves have been a sufficient cause of death,
that a complaint was issued for appellee's arrest. Thus,
the post-shooting debriefing and questioning of appellee
were conducted pursuant to routine administrative procedure, and appellee was neither being held as a criminal
suspect, nor had he reason to believe that such was the
case.
1d. at 560-61.
A similar result was reached in Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607
(Mass. 1986). In a prosecution for larceny and civil rights violations, a police officer attempted to exclude his statements made in an administrative investigation
following a citizen complaint of misconduct. Acknowledging that all police officers
were required by department rules to answer questions relating to official duties,
the court nevertheless concluded that "[tjhe fact that there existed the possibility
of adverse consequences from the defendant's failure to cooperate does not demonstrate that the defendant was 'compelled' to incriminate himself." 1d. at 611.
106. See United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1016, 101 S. Ct. 578 (1980); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607
(Mass. 1986); Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983).
107. 1d.
108. Id. This conclusion is consistent with the general requirement that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is waived if not affirmatively asserted. See Gamer v.
United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (failure to assert privilege on income tax return waived privilege).
109. See Devine v. Goodstein, 680 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Devine, an
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appellate courts' willingness to curtail Garrity and Gardner's
broad application in order to curb the potential for police
abuse.
In a number of cases, public employees have argued that
disciplinary proceedings should be postponed when criminal
investigations are pending against them. 110 They assert that

immigration inspector was suspended for failing to write a report responding to a
complaint of inappropriate behavior. An arbitrator hearing the employee's grievance reversed a suspension on the basis the privilege against self-incrimination
barred punishment for failing to write the report. The court reversed, finding that
the privilege against self-incrimination did not excuse the refusal to prepare the
report since "the employee did not believe and could not have reasonably believed
that his written report could be used in a criminal prosecution." 1d. at 247 (footnote omitted). The court noted that if the employee had a reasonable fear of criminal prosecution, "[iln order to compel a written report, the government would
have to have guaranteed that his answers could not be used against him in a
criminal case." 1d. at 247 n.23.
110. See Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982) (failure to postpone
administrative hearing pending resolution of related criminal charges, with officer
refusing to testify, did not violate the privilege); Peiffer v. Lebanon School District,
848 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1988) ("rather than being a case in which a public employee
or contractor has been penalized for asserting his Fifth Amendment privileges, the
situation here is simply that Peiffer did not rebut evidence constituting grounds
for his dismissal"); Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050, 107 S.Ct. 2183, 95 L.Ed.2d 839 (1987) ("fact that appellants had to choose whether to talk or to remain silent offends neither the fifth
nor the fourteenth amendment"); Diebold v. Civil Service Commission, 611 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1979) (injunction to prevent administrative hearing pending outcome
of criminal trial denied since no requirement that employee waive privilege);
Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491 (1990) (Michigan), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 137, 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990) (officer not entitled to grant of immunity so
that he can respond to charges against him). See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
84, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1897, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) ("That the defendant faces such a
dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense
has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.").
In United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1979), the court stated:
Keno contends that being forced to go to trial in a civil
case while criminal charges arising out of the same conduct were pending forced him to choose between preserving his fifth amendment privilege and losing the civil suit.
It appears to us, however, that Keno overstates his dilemma. He was not forced to surrender his privilege against
self-incrimination in order to prevent a judgment against
him; although he may have been denied his most effective
defense by remaining silent, there is no indication that
invocation of the fifth amendment would have necessarily
resulted in an adverse judgment.
[d. at 1286 (footnote omitted).
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an adequate defense cannot be mounted in the face of their
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 111
These arguments have also been rejected,1l2 even though the
fact-finder may draw adverse inferences from the public
employee's failure to testify.l13 Here again, courts are tailoring Garrity and Gardner to the realities of the criminal justice
system.
True to such trends, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
confined Garrity and Gardner to their facts.114 Recognizing
that they dealt with police officers subject to interrogation for
prior misconduct and not with the failure to perform specific
duties expected of all police officers, the unanimous court (per
Chief Justice Weintraub) refused to exclude from evidence in a
police officer's criminal trial a report an officer was required to
prepare. 115 The New Jersey high court found nothing in
Garrity or Gardner that excused a police detective's failure to
file a required report or his later submission of a false report. ll6 Duly mindful of existing case law, the New Jersey
court reasonably opined that the Supreme Court would not
extend Fifth Amendment doctrine to permit the assertion of
the privilege as a bar to the preparation of a report required of
a public officer. 117
111. [d.
112. [d.
113. See Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[w]e note that the

hearing examiner would not be constitutionally forbidden from drawing adverse
inferences from an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination").
114. See State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d. 13 (1972). The officer was
charged with failure to report an incident and filing a false report. [d. at 574, 292
A.2d. at 15.
115. [d. at 584, 292 A.2d at 20.
116. [d.
117. See id. In an analogous situation, military courts have reached the oppo-

site conclusion. In United States v. Lee, 25 M.J. 457 (C.MA 1988), the Court of
Military Appeals reversed the conviction by general court material of a serviceman
for violating a regulation requiring production of documentation showing continued
possession or lawful disposition of duty-free goods. The dissenting opinion would
have found the required records doctrine applicable. [d. at 469-70.
Article 31 of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C. § 831,
prohibits compulsory self-incrimination and in a requirement predating Miranda
prohibits interrogating any person suspected of a crime without a warning statement. Capt. Fredric L. Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (1976). The purpose of this requirement was stated by the Court of Military Appeals: "Because of a subordinate military person's obligation to respond to
the command of his superior, Congress enacted Article 31 to serve as a protection
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Obviously, the Court in Garrity and Gardner could have
framed the issue in terms of the officer's obligation to meet his
or her job duties. In each case, the officers had statutory duties
to cooperate with the criminal investigations. However, the
duty in those cases was to cooperate in criminal investigations
by submitting to interrogation. The investigations had many of
the earmarks of the inquisitional questioning that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was designed to prohibit. 118 Within that
constitutional realm, Garrity and Gardner are firmly grounded
in legal principle.
Notably, the Supreme Court has never confronted the
situation of an officer declining to prepare routine reports
based upon assertion of the privilege. In such a situation, the
officer is not required to choose between the privilege and loss
of employment. Rather, the officer is required to choose between exercising the privilege and doing his or her job. Faithful to the Garrity and Gardner decisions, a court could conclude that the loss of employment comes not from exercise of
the privilege but from failing to discharge the duties of the
job. u9 Absent such a salutary gloss on Garrity and Gardner,

against the inherent tendency of that relationship, either directly or subtly, to
induce an accused to respond to a question by the superior." United States v.
Lewis, 12 M.J. 205, 206 (C.M.A. 1982).
118. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 331 (1968).
119. One might argue that a public employee, accepting employment in the face
of requirements dictating waiver of the privilege, has consented to the waiver.
However, it is questionable that an individual can affirmatively renounce the protection of the privilege from governmental questioning at a time when he or she
has no occasion to invoke it. Compare United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 (1952) (bail sureties, by entering into surety
contracts, had waived the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to subsequent
questioning when some of the defendants jumped bail), with Morgan v. Thomas,
448 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972) (surety
agreement did not waive privilege because "it is difficult to understand how a
person can be punished by the sanction of contempt for asserting the privilege in
contravention to a prior contractual undertaking in no way contemplating circumstances which might make assertion of the privilege appropriate"). See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (test for waiver of constitutional right. But see Town
of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding agreement waiving civil
claims in exchange for dismissal of prosecution).
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected a contractual waiver in this very
context. In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), the Court held that contractors with the State of New York could not lose public works contracts by reason
of the failure to waive the privilege in criminal investigations. Applying Garrity
and Gardner, the Court held that contract termination, like job loss, violated the
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it would be difficult or impossible to control many forms of
potential or real police misconduct. Whatever else its purpose,
the privilege was not intended to turn public servants into
private bosses. True, locating the fault line that divides required duty from impermissible interrogation requires careful
searching. However, no matter how difficult this task, it nevertheless represents a necessary distinction to ensure that public
duty does not become subordinate to personal privilege.
An appropriate demarcation may to be found in the institutional policies of an agency. Reports required of all employees in circumstances when no evidence of wrongdoing exists
must be completed notwithstanding any personal claim of
privilege. For example, many public officers are required to
provide annual reports of their activities. An officer who fails
to provide such a report based upon assertion of the privilege
can be sanctioned not for asserting the privilege, but for failing
to meet the requirements of the job. Plainly, such requirements
are essential if responsible police rule is to be the norm.

Likewise, an officer who declines to provide reports required of every officer following a shooting should not be able
to seek refuge in Garrity and Gardner. Thus, the failure of an
officer to follow department procedures and submit a report
(such as that required by the Atlanta Police Departmene20),
to participate in a routine de-briefing or to testify in court in
any prosecution of the person shot could well be grounds for
discharge even if the reason for the refusal is invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. If an officer were to become the target of an actual criminal investigation,121 howev-

Fifth Amendment. [d. at 84-85. The statutory scheme struck down in Lefkowitz
included inserting contractual provisions in each public works contract providing
for the waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. [d. at 71 n.1. The Court did not
address whether these contractual provisions had any independent significance. See
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 130 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("nothing in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the acceptance of employment should be deemed a waiver of a specific protection that is as basic a
part of our constitutional heritage as is the privilege against self-incrimination").
120. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
121. It must be conceded that it is not always easy to ascertain when the officer is a target of criminal investigation. Thus a bright-line rule might be established that any criminal interrogation that is outside the routine reporting that all
police officers are expected to participate in on a daily basis is subject to Gardner-
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er, Garrity-Gardner should permit exercise of the privilege to
block interrogation in furtherance of such investigation without fear of job loss.122
From the officer's vantage point, he or she may well view
this distinction as simply an attempt to end-run Garrity and
Gardner. For some officers, the consequences of fulfilling one's
duties may be self-incrimination. Viewed from this standpoint,
it may appear that the officer is being required to choose between his or her job and the exercise of privilege. Yet courts in
other contexts have held people to the duties they have freely
assumed. Consider in this regard the logic of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that assertion of privilege
did not excuse compliance with the disclosure obligations of an
insurance policy:
Pervis seeks to recover proceeds based on the
insurance contract to which he is a party; he
must be held to the express terms of the agreement. He is not compelled to incriminate himself. He is, however, bound by the provisions to
which he stipulated when he signed the insurance agreement and cannot expect State Farm
to perform its obligations under the contract, by
being subject to suit for payment of proceeds,
without compliance on his part. 123

Likewise, police officers should not expect to have continued employment if they refuse to discharge their duties.124
Concomitant with the officer's willingness to exercise the
state's power of deadly force must be a willingness to account
for this public exercise of power. Any assertion of a private
Garrity.
122. It should be recognized that limiting the reach of Garrity and Gardner
would not be limited to police officers. Instead, it would have applicability to all
public employees who fail to perform specific job duties.
123. Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944, 947 (11th Cir.
1990).
124. Police officers generally expect that their public agency employer will pay
for any damages arising from an on-duty shooting. Under California law, a public
employee is entitled to indemnification for liability arising out of the course of
employment if the public employee provides "reasonable good-faith cooperation"
with the defense of the action. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 825 (West. Supp. 1994). In
addition to or as an alternative to job loss, indemnification could be denied in
situations in which the officer asserts the privilege.
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privilege is simply inconsistent with the nature of the power
that the officer voluntarily exercised. Indeed, it would be more
than puzzling if the Constitution allowed a public official wide
powers to take human life and thereafter accorded an equally
broad immunity from public accountability. To borrow from
Justice Jackson, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. 125

B.

REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE

Independent of the Garrity-Gardner analysis, disclosure
might be secured under another doctrine. Courts have carved
an exception to general Fifth Amendment principles, an exception known as the "required records doctrine. "126 First recognized in Shapiro v. United States,127 the required records doctrine provides "that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be
invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the
enforcement of its criminal laws. "128 The required records
doctrine applies to a variety of self-reporting scenarios. l29
In Shapiro, the United State Supreme Court considered a
reporting scheme required by the Emergency Price Control
Act.130 The Act required that businesses keep and disclose
sales records "customarily kept" by the business. Rejecting the
assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court stated
that the privilege "cannot be maintained in relation to 'records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects

125. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
126. See Stephen A. Saltz burg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for
the Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1986).
127. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
128. Baltimore City Department of Social Service v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549
(1990).
129. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 MARv. L. REv..
129, 178-79 (1990) ("Court has established an exception ... prohibiting invocation
of the privilege when a defendant is required to disclose infonnation as part of a
civil regulatory scheme"); Jeremy Temkin, "Hollow Ritual{sl": The Fifth Amendment
and Self-Reporting, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1986) ("there is a recognition that, in
some situations, self-reporting may be relied upon for the production of infonnation").
130. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 3-4.
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of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions
validly established."'131 Writing for the 5-4 majority, the Chief
Justice emphasized:
It may be assumed at the outset that there are
limits which the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be inspected by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting
statutory violations committed by the recordkeeper himself. But no serious misgivings that
those bounds have been overstepped would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient
relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the
basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally
require the keeping of particular records .... 132

In a sharp dissent, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority
for "hardly find[ing] a problem in disposing of an issue farreaching in its implications, involving as they do a drastic
change in the relations between the individual and the Government as hitherto conceived."133 While the full scope of
Shapiro is somewhat ambiguous, certain matters have become
more settled over time.
Following Shapiro, the Court initially defined the scope of
the required records doctrine in the context of laws designed to
assist law enforcement efforts. Concluding that the doctrine
does not apply where the regulatory scheme is principally
aimed at criminal activity, the Court found unconstitutional
regulatory schemes requiring disclosures by gamblers,l34 wagers,135 communists ,136 illegal weapons possessors 137 and
transferrers of marijuana. 13B However, "[iJn all of these cases
the disclosures condemned were only those extracted from a

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

[d. at 33 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911».
Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 32.
[d. at 50.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). .
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'highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities'
and the privilege was applied only in 'an area permeated with
criminal statutes' - not in 'an essentially noncriminal and
regulatory area of inquiry.",139
The required records doctrine was subsequently expanded
in California v. Byers.l40 In Byers, the United States Supreme
Court upheld provisions of the California Vehicle Code requiring drivers to exchange certain information following a traffic
accident. 141 Reversing the California Supreme Court's decision that immunity was required in order to compel such information,142 the Court's plurality opinion upheld the reporting
requirement. Although noting the tension between the privilege and the information needs of the State, the Byers Court
observed that any resolution required "balancing the public
need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other."l43 Under such a regulatory
scheme, the Court concluded that "the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor
of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged
here."l44
The most recent Supreme Court application of the required records doctrine is found in Baltimore City Department
of Social Services v. Bouknight. l45 In Bouknight, the mother
of an abused child was given the choice of producing her child
139. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
140. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
141. See 1967 CAL. STAT. 2009 (current version in CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002
(West Supp. 1994».
142. Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1969). Justice Peters, speaking for the California Supreme Court, stated the conflict created by such reporting statutes:
[T]he present case exemplifies a conflict much discussed
by commentators in recent years, the conflict between the
individual's right to protection under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
government's substantial interest in having citizens report
or otherwise divulge information to effectuate various
regulatory measures designed to promote the public welfare.
Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
143. Byers, 402 U.S.at 427.
144. Id. at 428.
145. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
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or rem8.1mng incarcerated. l46 Although recognizing that the
act of production may be both testimonial and incriminating,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that "Bouknight
may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order
because she has assumed custodial duties related to production
and because production is required as part of a noncriminal
regulatory scheme."147 Invoking the required records doctrine,
the Court found that the obligation to permit inspection of the
child is "part of a broadly directed, noncriminal regulatory
regime governing children cared for pursuant to custodial orders. ,,146 Noting the absence of the general exceptions to the
Shapiro doctrine, the Court concluded that persons who care
for children pursuant to custody orders are not a "selective
group" or "inherently suspect of criminal activities"149 and
that efforts to gain access to children are not aimed principally
at criminal conduct,l50 but "for reasons related entirely to the
child's well-being. ,,151
Although Bouknight is believed to have "dramatically
expanded" the required records doctrine,152 the Court did create some doctrinal confusion by suggesting that the fruits of
any disclosures might not be used in a criminal prosecu146. Id. at 553.
147. Id. at 555-56.
148. Id. at 559 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911»
(citations omitted).
149. Id. at 559.
150. Id. at 560.
151. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 560.
152. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 lIARv. L. REv..
129, 179 (1990). One commentator has observed:
Thus, Bouknight can be viewed as the latest in a line of
cases in which the Court gives states the greatest leeway
when they act with dual purposes, no matter how close
the relationship between the regulatory purpose and the
criminal law objective. The danger to civil liberties cannot
be underestimated. AB long as there is any component of
a civil regulatory scheme ostensibly beyond the needs of
law enforcement, government presumably will be free from
constraints imposed by the criminal guarantees in the Bill
of Rights.
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege
Against Self·Incrimination, 76 IOWA L. REv. 535 (1991). Of course, "the ostensibly
beyond the needs of law enforcement" qualification is the crux of the constitutional
question. Hence, even Bouknight critics apparently concede the limited reach of the
privilege.
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tion. 153 If immunity were required in order to obtain information from Ms. Bouknight, the Court took the wrong path in
reaching its decision. Information obtained under the required
records doctrine may be used in criminal proceedings. Indeed,
in Byers the Court reversed the state court holding that immunity was required to compel disclosure of information by
drivers involved in automobile accidents. 154
Notwithstanding the Bouknight wrinkle, the required
records doctrine is firmly established as part of today's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. Following the Supreme Court's
lead, lower courts have applied the required records doctrine in
a variety of contexts. 155 And if the Court· is troubled by such
153. See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561-62. The Court emphasized:
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations
that may exist upon the State's ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of production in subsequent criminal proceedings." But we note that imposition
of such limitations is not foreclosed. . . . In a broad range
of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' ability to use testimony that has been compelled.
[d.

154. See Supra note 141 and accompanying text.
155. See United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 108 (1992) (affirming conviction for possession of controlled substance on aircraft without reporting it for entry on cargo manifest); United States v. Lehman,
887 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction for failure to comply with laws
requiring livestock sales transaction records); United States v. Alkhafaji, 754 F.2d
641 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming conviction for failure to make disclosures required
by the Gun Control Act of 1968); United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (affirming conviction for failing to make
certain reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act); United States v. Stirling, 571
F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (affirming conviction for fraud
arising out of failure to make disclosures required by securities laws); In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) ("disclosure is required as part of a
noncriminal statutory scheme for administration of bankruptcy estates which requires such disclosures for liquidation of the same and in no sense is aimed particularly at prospective criminal defendants"); cf. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Collins, 997 U.S. 1230 (7th Cir. 1993) (required records doctrine inapplicable to income tax return in taxpayer's possession since no law required taxpayer to keep copy); United States v. Dean, 989 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (appointment calendar not subject to required requires doctrine because there was no
duty to create such document); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir.
1991) (Bouknight not controlling because "the government does not contend that
appellants were required to maintain the documents it seeks or to submit them
for inspection as conditions of doing business with the government").
One district court has concluded that, even though the required records
doctrine applied to the records themselves, the act of producing the records would
constitute compelled, testimonial, and incriminating communication. In re Grand
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applications, it certainly has not so indicated by way of its
certiorari policy in this area.
Today, the required records doctrine is most likely to arise
in the context of an individual resisting compliance with government reporting laws. In circumstances in which documentary information has already been generated, other Fifth Amendment principles usually allow the government to gain access to
it. Thus, under the collective entity rule 156 the books and reJury Subpoena, 144 F.R.D. 357, 365-66 (D. Minn. 1992). Although the Supreme

Court has applied this doctrine in other contexts (Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976», it has never
been invoked to shield required records. In fact, in Bouknight the Court stated:
The possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not,
in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist
production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial
assertion is sufficiently incriminating and "sufficiently
testimonial for purposes of the privilege," Bouknight may
not invoke the privilege to resist the production order
because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a
noncriminal regulatory regime.
Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 781
F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1986) (act of production doctrine inapplicable to required records).
The California Supreme Court has applied the required records doctrine,
fmding it consistent with the state constitutional privilege. In Craib v. Bulmash,
49 Cal. 3d 475, 777 P.2d 1120, 261 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1989), the court considered
whether the privilege barred the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement from
compelling production of an employer's time and wage records. The court rejected
the claim of privilege on the basis of the required records doctrine. Surveying the
history of the required records doctrine, the court noted: "The lower federal courts
continue to apply the 'required records doctrine' of Shapiro, while distinguishing
Marchetti and its progeny. And, following the lead of Byers, several cases have
allowed the mandatory disclosure of information which, on its face, could implicate
the reporter in criminal conduct." 49 Cal. 3d at 489 (citations omitted).
156. The collective entity rule was first recognized in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906), in which the Supreme Court held that a corporation has no privilege
under the Fifth Amendment. Five years later, the Court held that a corporate
officer had no personal privilege to resist production of corporate records. Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The collective entity rule has been extended to
both unincorporated associations (United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944» and
partnerships (Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974». These decisions squarely
hold that:
The plain mandate of these decisions is that without
regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as a
custodian, a corporate custodian. . . may not resist a
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cords of corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations are not privileged because such entities have no Fifth
Amendment privilege. Likewise, there is no privilege in documents which have been voluntarily created by an individual. l57 In some circumstances, however, an individual may
have a Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to produce the document if the act of production might be incriminating.158

subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment
grounds.
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1988) (citations omitted).
157. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). In Doe, the government
sought production of business records of a sole proprietorship. The Court concluded
that the records were not privileged:
Respondent does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him
to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents.
The fact that the records are in respondent's possession is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of
the records was compelled.
[d. at 611-12 (footnote omitted).
158. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court stated:
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of
the papers demanded and their possession or control by
the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief
that the papers are those described in the subpoena. The
elements of compulsion are clearly present, but the more
difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the
taxpayer are both "testimonial" and "incriminating" for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
[d. at 410 (citation omitted).
Although the Fisher Court found that the production of records of an accountant by the taxpayer would not involve testimonial self-incrimination, the
Court in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), held that the production of
certain records by a sole proprietor would. [d. at 613-14.
In Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), the Court refused to extend Fisher and Doe to the act of production by the sole shareholder of a corporation, finding the collective entity rule precluded any assertion of privilege. However, the Court held that the act of production itself could not be used against the
individual:
Although a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a
subpoena on the ground that his act of production will be
personally incriminating, we do think certain consequences
flow from the fact that the custodian's act of production is
one in his representative rather than personal capacity.
Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it
may make no evidentiary use of the "individual act"
against the individual.
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Given its current scope, the required records doctrine can
be used to require police officers to provide accounts of on-duty
shootings. A reporting requirement (again similar to that of
the Atlanta Police Department159 ) would likely prevail over
the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The reporting
requirement is part of a civil regulatory system governing
public employees. The requirement is not aimed at a group
inherently suspect of criminal activity, and is the type of record customarily expected of police officers. So long as the
requirement operates in this way, it is not likely to be set
aside on Fifth Amendment privilege grounds.
Application of the required records doctrine has broader
implications than simply limiting the scope of Garrity and
Gardner. If Garrity and Gardner do not apply, the police officer
still has the availability of the privilege, but its exercise may
result in job loss. If, however, the required records doctrine can
be invoked, the officer would face not only job loss, but also
some form of compulsion to force revelation of the required
information. 160 Compelling an individual to reveal information that in some jurisdictions would constitute a capital crime
highlights the dangers inherent in expansive application of the
required records doctrine.
For a variety of reasons, the required records doctrine is
probably not the appropriate vehicle to secure unimmunized
statements from police officers. From a practical standpoint,
police agencies are unlikely to seek the judicial intervention
that would ultimately be necessary to compel an officer to give
a statement. Police administrators prefer remedies that they
control; they do not want to rely upon outsiders to keep their
house in order. Moreover, most police administrators would
view job loss as an appropriate sanction for failure to provide a
required report.

Id. at 117-18.
159. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
160. Some statutory authorization would be required to compel a police officer
to complete the report. Although police departments possess the authority to suspend or termination police officers for violation of departmental policies, specific
enforcement is generally not available.
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The availability of the required records doctrine, however,
may be important in securing a narrowing construction of
Garrity and Gardner. If application of the required records
doctrine would result in the an officer being obligated to provide the required report, Garrity and Gardner should not block
a police agency from firing an officer who fails to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
The code of silence following on-duty shootings raises an
important constitutional question concerning the conflict between public duty and individual rights. Some argue that the
current practice of conferring use immunity strikes an appropriate balance between the government's need for information
and the police officer's constitutional rights. In using deadly
force, however, the police officer was not exercising an individual constitutional right but was instead acting as an instrumentality of the state. Accordingly, those officers who choose to
exercise this immense power should be publicly accountable for
the use of force. Such accountability is consistent with current
law (constitutional, statutory, and administrative) and likewise
accords with sound public policy principles. To deny the wisdom of such practices and principles would lead inevitably to a
parade of horribles, one in which police misconduct of all kinds
- from coverups to unlawful killings - would be tolerated and
even encouraged. A code of silence would thus become synonymous with a code of tyranny.
Justice Scalia once observed that "[n]o law enforcement
agency is required by the First Amendment to permit one of its
employees to 'ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers.,"161
No law enforcement agency is required by the Fifth Amendment to permit one of its employees to shoot like a cop and
remain silent like a murderer. Admittedly, as phrased, this
assertion seems brazen. Still, it is defensible if only because it
calls much needed attention to a basic lesson of life and law:
To remain oblivious to the obvious is both unsound and unsafe.

161. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (quoting App. 94).
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